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The case for one share, one vote is quite robust to the way the takeover game is played,
provided one goes all the way and allows not just toeholds or multiple bids and revisions but
also bargaining. But a rule that exclusion should never harm the non-voting shares, or that
these shares should be taken over at the pre-bid price, will do as well, without so severely
curtailing a ﬁrm’s room for security design. Under either rule, all privately beneﬁcial takeovers
are socially desirable and vice versa, and the value gains are shared fairly between the current
shareholders and the bidder.
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Introduction
In a standard model of takeovers with exclusion, the players’ private beneﬁts are given exoge-
nously, as are the initial toeholds in the target company’s equity, if any. Equally important,
the authors of the model typically impose the sequence of the take-over game—for instance
one bid followed by at most one counterbid—without checking whether the players would have
chosen that sequence themselves. Famously, Grossman and Hart (GH, 1988) and Harris and
Raviv (HR, 1988, 1989) used one such setting to discuss the (non-)optimality of one share/one
vote (1S1V). The purpose of the paper is to study the issue of optimal voting structure in a less
restrictive framework. While, in the original GH-HR structure of the game, 1S1V is no longer
optimal if one allows toeholds or revised bids, it re-merges as a perfect rule as soon as we let
the players freely decide on the takeover game—like chosing the toeholds, the number of bids
and counterbids, or the use or bargaining at any stage where it appears to be useful. However,
1S1V is not the only way to achieve this. Alternative legal structures would do equally well,
like a rule saying that non-voting stock should be taken over at the pre-bid value, or a rule that
exclusion is unrestricted provided the non-voting stockholder are not harmed. Under either
1S1V and the alternative rules, all successful takeovers are socially desirable and vice versa,
and any social gains are split fairly between the current shareholders and the new owner.
The background is as follows. The seminal papers in the literature on voting structure,
Grossman and Hart (GH, 1988) and Harris and Raviv (HR, 1988, 1989) derive conditions for the
optimality of 1S1V. The GH-HR papers have a rather similar set-up (which we broadly adopt
in our work). Speciﬁcally, there are two types of cash ﬂows: the security beneﬁts accruing
to the security holders, and the private beneﬁts obtained by the controlling party. A rival
management team attempts to dismiss the incumbent managers and take control of the target
ﬁrm. Incumbent and rival teams have diﬀerent management abilities, which aﬀects the level of
both the security beneﬁts and the private beneﬁts. GH establish conditions for the optimality
of 1S1V from the perspective of an entrepreneur writing a charter. They argue that, by and
large, 1S1V is optimal. They do acknowledge exceptions, but conﬁne that particular part ofEndogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 2
their analysis to an example, arguing that these exceptions should be rare and insigniﬁcant. HR
(1988), in a similar set-up, ﬁnd that a simple majority rule in combination with 1S1V are the
socially optimal structure. However, an entrepreneur in their model, if allowed, would often
prefer to issue two extreme securities, one with pure votes and one with only cash ﬂow rights.
In a more general version of their ﬁrst paper, HR (1989) stress that an entrepreneur would
optimally issue a single voting security, and that this ”generalizes the results of GH (1988) and
HR (1988) who proved the optimality of one-share one-vote ...”
The focus of the above papers and the claim of one-share one-vote being an optimal struc-
ture overall, ﬁt in a context. First, the papers were written at a time a policy debate was
in full swing as to whether the 1S1V structure had to be a requirement for listing on a US
stock exchange. The research question in GH and HR is therefore rather normative, focused
on whether exceptions on 1S1V should be allowed for or not, rather than on examining the
mechanics behind these deviations. Second, the modeling of the takeover process followed the
standard of the time. Notably, there is a bid by the rival, which could possibly be followed
by one counterbid by the incumbent. Also, neither of the contenders owns any shares in the
target company. Lastly, the levels of the private beneﬁts are exogenously ﬁxed. One objective
behind this paper is to ﬁnd out to what extent these restrictions are innocent.
Initial shareholdings are potentially important to the bidder as they reduce the cost of the
takeover or, stated diﬀerently, let the bidder capture part of the capital gain. To the incum-
bent, on the other hand, shareholdings in the target company provide more of an incentive to
counterbid. In the absence of an equity stake, management throws in the towel as soon as they
see that counterbidding would cost more than the value (to the incumbent) of the shares; but
a stake in the equity provides an incentive to counterbid and drive up the price as long as a
rational rival can be expected to come back with a higher price. The role of toeholds interacts
with the numbers of bids and counterbids that are allowed. The above game of driving up
the price is possible only if we allow the bidder at least one revision. (In practice, of course,
perfectly informed players would immediately go the ﬁnal solution; so the fact that one rarely
sees multiple-round bids does not contradict the need for leaving the players that option.)
As shown by Sercu and Van Hulle (1995), allowing for bargaining is crucial too. With
many bidding rounds and no bargaining, the rival has to start very close to her reservation
price—otherwise the current owners can counterbid close to that reservation price themselves,
forcing the rival to revise the bid and oﬀer basically the reservation price itself (HR 1988). This
counterintuitive but logical outcome is ruled out if the rival can bargain. The rival then just letsEndogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 3
the current management make a winning counterbid, and then opens talks; the negotiations
should allow a price somewhere halfway between both parties’ threat points instead of just
below the rival’s threat point or reservation price. This is the rival’s best strategy, and the
incumbent cannot do anything about it: talking is the best way to limit the damage.
It is also important to leave the order of bargaining versus bidding unconstrained. If,
like Berkovitch and Khanna (1991), one allows only bargaining followed by bidding, then the
incumbent simply walks away from the negotiation table and starts bidding close to the rival’s
reservation price, leaving her again no choice but to oﬀer basically the reservation price.
Lastly, when a bid surfaces (or rumors thereof), in reality a target company often reacts
by announcing a reorganization. This means that the incumbents can cut the private beneﬁts,
if they feel this is useful. The level of private beneﬁts must be even more of a choice variable
for the bidder: and if it is in her interest to go for a low level of private beneﬁts, this should
be allowed in the model.
Our purpose accordingly is to revise the original 1S1V case with minimal restrictions on
the game. Section 1 brieﬂy reviews the argument for 1S1V in the original setting. Section 2
conﬁrms that with an unrestricted take-over strategy the original conclusion still holds, and
that allowing for bargaining is crucial in this. Section 3 considers an alternative to 1S1V. We
conclude in Section 4.
1 The basic set-up
1.1 Assumptions
The setting closely follows the assumptions in GH. An entrepreneur with no ﬁnancial resources
has started up a ﬁrm. She appoints a management team i, the incumbent, under whose control
the ﬁrm generates security cash ﬂows yi and private beneﬁts zi. The entrepreneur also issues
two classes of shares, notably A shares that have all voting rights, and non-voting B shares.
The cash ﬂows are distributed across both classes, with a fractions sa and 1−sa accruing to the
A and B stock, respectively. The entrepreneur also sets a level for α, the proportion of votes a
team needs to assume control of the company. Lastly, the founder sells all claims to atomistic,
risk-neutral investors. The questions in this paper are whether one level of sa is socially more
desirable than others and, if so, whether it is in the founder’s own interest to chose exactly
that level. We are particularly interested in whether it is optimal to chose sa = 1. In that
case, the B shares, having neither voting power nor cash ﬂow rights, play no role whatsoever,Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 4
which means that we have a de facto 1S1V situation with just A shares.
The cash ﬂow rule and the required number of votes for a change of control are important
in case of an attempted take-over. The take-over issue arises from the arrival of a rival, r,
under whose management the ﬁrm would generate a cash ﬂow yr and private beneﬁts zr.
These characteristics are known to all investors. In the GH-HR version, the private beneﬁts
are exogenous. In one of our variants, we let the contenders set zj endogenously, up to some
bounds.
The rival management team publicly announces its bid, taking into account that any bid
may trigger a reaction from the incumbent. In the GH-HR version there is just this one bid
and one counterbid. In our variants, we allow the rival to revise at least once, and we allow
either player to resort to bargaining at whatever moment this seems useful. (The other player
can, of course, refuse to take part in negotiations.) In line with the post-GH-HR literature
we consider just conditional bids for all shares. The reason for considering just conditional
bids is that the GH-HR unconditional oﬀers create a problem with the existence of equilibrium.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) discuss this issue and also illustrate how prima facie unconditional
bids are, in practice, so hedged around with escape clauses that the diﬀerence with conditional
bids becomes tenuous. Bids for part of the shares, instead of our oﬀers for all shares, would
generally require a diﬀerent analysis, but in our model the distinction does not matter. Many
countries (e.g. all EU members) require any partial bid or private block transfer to be followed
by an oﬀer for the remaining shares, at the same price, anyway.
After r’s ﬁnal bid (and i’s ﬁnal counterbid, if any), investors choose to tender shares or
votes to either i or r. After this tendering stage, a vote is held, and all shareholders vote.
A change of control occurs when more than the fraction α of the voters vote in favor of the
change. In the bargaining variant discussed in this paper, the winner can then again talk to
the loser, if that is mutually beneﬁcial. In fact, under our full-information assumption nothing
is gained by explicitly playing a multi-stage game: r moves only if she will succeed, and r’s
ﬁrst move, if any, will be her only one. Still, the level of that one bid is of course determined
by the outcome of the explicit game.Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 5
1.2 The case for 1S1V legislation in the basic model
In this one-bid, one-counterbid game, r’s reservation price for all of the A-shares is the one
that nets her no proﬁt at all, and similarly for i:
pmax
a,r = sayr + zr; (1)
pmax
i,r = sayi + zi. (2)
From this, the condition for a successful takeover immediately follows:
sayr + zr > sayi + zi. (3)
Provided that this condition is met, the equilibrium bid price is the lowest price that silences
i (i.e. pa,r ≥ pmax
i,r ) and meets the no free-riding bound for the third shareholders, pa,r ≥ sayr:
pa,r = max(sayi + zi,sayr),
= sayr + max(sa(yi − yr) + zi, 0). (4)
Is this socially eﬃcient? Social eﬃciency requires a bigger total cake (i.e. yr +zr > yi+zi)
and, preferably, no losers among the small shareholders. (We are less tenderhearted towards i,
who may lose the perks from control to r.) Obviously, in this game there cannot be any losers
if the bidder and the current A-shareholders agree and if there are there are no B shares. More
formally, if the charter stipulates as = 1, the X-eﬃciency condition yr +zr > yi +zi no longer
diﬀers from the success condition, Equation (3).
If 1S1V aligns private and social interests once the charter is written, is it also in the
founder’s interest to set up the company this way, or must it be imposed by law? The familiar
problem is that founders cannot universally be expected to set up the company as a 1S1V
one. To see this, consider the value realized by the founder if the prospective bidder is strong
enough: the market value of the B shares under r’s management plus the bid price on the
A-shares if r takes over. From Equation (4),
Wr := pa.r + (1 − sa)yr
= yr + max(sa(yi − yr) + zi, 0),
= yr + max(zi − sa(yr − yi) + zi, 0). (5)
We see that if the company is going to be taken over and we have 0 < yr − yi < zi/sa, then
the max part of the GH-HR valuation (5) is “in the money”, and the more so the lower sa. InEndogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 6
that case the value of the company is maximized by setting sa = 0; that is, the A shares are
pure voting stocks or control rights without security cash-ﬂow rights. As a result, the takeover
condition becomes just zr > zi. This is not as bad as it may look: that solution arises iﬀ
yr > yi, so that by assumption both the A- and B-shares still come out ahead and the takeover
surely adds value. Rather, from the social point of view the problem is that, if the contenders
ignore the beneﬁt of that accrues to the security holders, some socially desirable takeovers will
not take place. Hence the case for regulation that imposes sa = 1.
Positive economists could object that if this is such a big issue, then one would either see
more of these pure voting securities or, by way of reaction, many countries that impose 1S1V.
Normative economists, on the other hand, might wonder whether there is no alternative to
1S1V that does not restrict a company’s choices so directly. Dual-class shares may make the
market more complete, after all, or appeal to certain client` eles. One possible consideration,
relevant to both positivists and normatives, is that the case for 1S1V breaks down as soon as
the GH-HR is extended by either the chance of a revised bid or initial toeholds. We ﬁrst explain
this argument and then show that this objection to 1S1V is demined if we realize the contenders
can also bargain. We next propose an alternative explanation for the non-universality of 1S1V
based on strategic exclusion.
2 Are toeholds in multi-stage bidding games an argument against
1S1V?
2.1 1S1V with toeholds and revisions of bids
First consider toeholds, i.e. initial holdings of shares A held by r or i. It is easy to show that
in a one-bid/one-counterbid game the size of i’s initial equity stake does not matter, provided
it is below α. To see why, we start from i’s reservation price for i, given an oﬀer pa,r. This is
the maximum he can counterbid without being worse oﬀ relative to selling out to r:
pmax
a,i : sayi + zi − (1 − ta,i)pmax
a,i = ta,i pa,r. (6)
But provided that r still makes some money by it, her game is to oﬀer i’s reservation price.
Setting pa,r = pmax
i,r , we ﬁnd that the old reservation price, Equation (2), remains valid, as if i
had no equity stake whatsoever. Intuitively, i’s equity stake does not aﬀect his reservation value
because r’s oﬀer is i’s reservation price. This then replaces a cash cost by an opportunity cost:
not selling a stake to r is as costly, to i, as buying a similar fraction from third shareholders
if there is no toehold to begin with. To r, in contrast, the toehold is likely to help, at leastEndogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 7
under the (weak) condition that sayr + zr > sayi:
pmax
a,r : sayr + zr − (1 − ta,r)pmax
a,r = ta,r sayi;
⇒ pmax
a,r =
sayr + zr − ta,r sayi
1 − ta,r
,
= sayr + zr +
ta,r
1 − ta,r
(sayr + zr − sayi). (7)
Thus, a bid that would have been a zero-NPV event in the absence of a toehold now gets a
strictly positive value to r as her initial shareholdings rise in value, from ta,r sayi to ta,r (sayr+
zr). Similarly, some bids that would have been irrational without toehold will now make sense.
Thus, to guarantee X eﬃciency we now seem to need not just sa = 1 but also ta,r = 0. Since
forbidding toeholds is almost unthinkable, the case for imposing 1S1V is weakened.
It may have looked counterintuitive that i’s toehold does not matter. But that conclusion is
void as soon as, more realistically, r gets the chance to revise her original bid. The incumbent
then weighs the option of buying up all A shares and retaining control not against the alter-
native of accepting r’s opening bid, but against the alternative of accepting r’s next, revised
bid. This revised bit can be steered by i: just counterbid two ticks below r’s reservation value,
leaving r room for a marginally proﬁtable revised bid one tick below her reservation value.
But if the rival is forced to pay out essentially all her private beneﬁts, many socially desirable
takeovers will not take place. Again, 1S1V will not change that conclusion.
Introducing toeholds and revisions does add realism; but our objection is that one should go
even further and introduce also unrestricted bargaining. It turns out that the players’ option
to negotiate restores the original case for 1S1V to its original form.
2.2 1S1V in a bidding+bargaining game
Suppose the players have the right to not only bid/counterbid/revise but also to bargain, and
they can do so at any time they agree to do so. From our earlier discussion, r cannot voluntarily
prefer to end with bidding, because this would give i the opportunity to drive up the price,
forcing r to give up almost all gains in her last oﬀer. Instead of chosing this disastrous route,
r makes an opening bid that is easily beaten by i, and does not revise the original oﬀer when
i counterbids, thus letting i win. Then r oﬀers talks. The incumbent enters the negotiations
as the sole owner of all A shares (worth sayi)—except for a toehold ta,r possibly retained by
r—and still entitled to the private beneﬁts zi. The rival now oﬀers a price pne
a,r. The stakes
and gains are shown in Table 1.Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 8
Table 1: Stakes in the bargaining game with nonvoting stock
i’s values r’s values total (i + r)
agreement (1 − ta,r)pne
a,r sayr + zr − (1 − ta,r)pne
a,r sayr + zr
breakdown (1 − ta,r)sayi + zi ta,r sayi sayi + zi
gain (1 − ta,r)(pne
a,r − sayi) − zi sayr + zr − pne
a,r + ta,r(pne
a,r − sayi) (sayr + zr) − (sayi + zi)
Note how i’s initial equity stake is again out of the picture: since the incumbent bought
all the shares other than r’s retained toehold (if any), the size of i’s original position no longer
matters. As to r’s toehold, it is obvious from Table 1 that r’s fall-back position or threat point,
should negotiations fail, increase with ta,r while it weakens i’s. Therefore r does not sell out.1
Note also that while r’s toehold aﬀects the threat points and therefore the negotiated price,
it does not aﬀect the total gain, so it does not aﬀect the condition for a successful takeover
either. Speciﬁcally, there is scope for negotiations (and a guarantee of success, with rational
players) if sayr + zr > sayi + zi, exactly as in the original model. Given this, the outcome is
some price that is a convex combination of both valuations and, therefore, leaves both players
part of the gain. Let xr (with 0 < xr < 1) denote the share of the beneﬁts that goes to r. For
instance, in the axiomatic Nash solution xr equals 1/2, while in the Rubinstein game (Sutton,
1986) it would give r a small ﬁrst-mover advantage (xr > 1/2) if an extra bargaining round
would have taken time and if time is money. After some tedious algebra we get the following
two alternative expressions for the negotiated take-over price:
pne
a,r = sayr +




zi + (1 − xr)[(sayr + zr) − (sayi + zi)]
1 − ta,r
. (9)
We now proceed to the implications of the bargaining solution for the preceding bidding
game. Suppose that r opens with an oﬀer below pne
a,r. For this to be more than an empty gesture,
this price must exceed the post-bid security value sayr. So if pne
a,r > sayr the contenders can
go through the full version of the game: (a) r starts with any oﬀer in the interval [sayr, pne
a,r[;
(b) i oﬀers more, knowing that he will be able to resell the shares to r during the negotiation
round at pne
a,r; the third shareholders sell out, r does not; (c) in a private transfer, r buys all of
1In Sercu and Van Hulle (1995) it is assumed that there is no toehold or that r sells out in the bidding phase;
this would be optimal only if i’s oﬀer price is bid up all the way to p
ne
a,r.Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 9
i’s A shares at pne
a,r. The alternative (implicit) version of the entire game is that r immediately
oﬀers pne
a,r to all holders of A shares, and succeeds.
Suppose, alternatively, that pne
a,r is below sayr. Then r can still play the implicit version:
immediately oﬀer sayr, and succeed. The incumbent cannot counterbid since r would then not
revise and trump i but let him win. The incumbent’s only remaining option would then be a
negotiated block sale at pne
a,r, by assumption below i’s purchase price. In short, when pne
a,r is
below sayr, bargaining is just a threat that stops i from trying to drive up the price; the talks







The analysis of the stakes already told us that the condition for a successful takeover
simpliﬁes to an X-eﬃciency condition if sa = 1, the quasi-1S1V charter, like in the HR-GH base
case. We now show that, again like in GH-HR, the founder might not go for this charter. To
see this, consider the value realized by the founder if the rival makes a successful bid. From
Equations (10) and (8) we obtain
Wr := pa,r + (1 − sa)yr (11)
= yr + Max
 





Note that xr ≥ 1/2 and ta,r  1/2—otherwise r would already be in control—so that (xr −
ta,r) is positive. So when pne
a,r > sayr and yr > yi, the ﬁrm’s total value falls the higher
sa, which means that the founder has no incentive to impose 1S1V under that condition;
rather, the temptation would be to go for extreme separation of voting rights and cash rights.
Qualitatively, this is the same conclusion as in the basic GH-HR model, but the interval where
this is valid may often be wider than in the basic model:







sa (xr−ta,r) , (bidding+bargaining).
(13)
When pne
a,r < sayr the founder is indiﬀerent, and when pne
a,r > sayr but yr > yi the founder
prefers a 1S1V charter, again as in the basic model.
3 An alternative to 1S1V
The normative economist looking for an alternative to 1S1V might consider a standard Pareto
rule (do not harm the B shares) and then hope that normal greed will do its work. We show thatEndogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 10
this actually works. The positive economist who looks for an explanation why 1S1V regulation is
not widespread and why, given this, pure-voting securities are nevertheless rare might therefore
conclude that, perhaps, the bidder does maximize exclusion subject to a no-harm-to-B rule,
inspired by PR considerations or fear of litigation.
To see this, let us now drop the assumption that both security and private beneﬁts are
exogenous, and think instead about the optimal level of the private beneﬁts for an exogenously
given total cash-generating power of Vi or Vr. We write the value of the A shares, cum control
perks, to player j = {i,r} as
sayj + zj = sa (Vj − zj) + zj = saVj + (1 − sa)zj. (14)
In this, Vj depends on j’s (exogenous) talents but zj is chosen strategically, within legal or
contractual constraints. From the stakes shown in Table 1, it is in i’s interest to maximize
zi because this increases i’s threat point and, therefore, the price i gets for surrendering the
shares and the control rights that go with them. In fact, maximizing zi was in i’s interest all
along. For this reason, i leaves his private beneﬁts at zi when the takeover contest starts. The
rival likewise sets zr at the highest possible level: this increases the value of the assets r takes
home, and while part of that gain is shared with i via a a higher pne
a,r, r still gets to keep a
fraction xr of any extra private beneﬁts.
When maximizing the announced private beneﬁts the rival, unlike i, should not expect
any protests from the A shareholders: they stand to beneﬁt from rs higher reservation value
because this also increases the takeover price r pays for the A shares. So the party to watch is
the B shareholders. Remember that changes in value of the B shares are at the root of possible
market failures here, with a weak rival winning because she is better at ﬂeecing the Bs, or with
a stronger rival losing out because too much value gain leaks away to the Bs. But if r sets
the private beneﬁts such that the B shareholders neither win nor lose, the same is achieved
without having to impose 1S1V:
(1 − sa)yr = (1 − sa)yi ⇔ Vr − zr = Vi − zi ⇔ zr = zi + (Vr − Vi). (15)
We conclude that, under this constraint, the privately optimizing values are
zi = zi, (16)
zr = zi + (Vr − Vi), (17)
yr = yi. (18)Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 11
We substitute these values into the success condition sayr +zr > sayi +zi and get, as the new
takeover condition,
Vr > Vi. (19)









zi + (1 − xr)(Vr − Vi)
1 − ta,r
. (20)
This says that a rival without toehold pays out (i) the entire original private beneﬁt, and (ii)
about half of the total value gain. With a toehold, the pay-out per share is even higher.2
Can we rely on the rival to choose that column, or do we need legislation? Since the
rival has no incentive to stop at a lower level of private beneﬁts, the relevant question is
whether she can be relied upon not to take more than the critical level. By assumption the
B shares are non-voting securities for the purpose of takeovers, but they need not be voiceless
on other matters, including extraction and private beneﬁts. So the question is whether the B
shareholders’ power, or PR considerations, or the press are suﬃciently adequate instruments to
restrain the rival. If not, a SEC-like institution may be required vet the tender oﬀers on behalf
of the B shareholders, or one can impose a rule that B-shares should be bought out, too, at a
price that is fair by pre-takeover standards. In either case, legislation may be required. But
that legislation needs not be 1S1V.
4 Conclusion
The case for 1S1V is quite robust to the way the takeover game is played, provided one goes
all the way and allows not just toeholds or multiple bids and revisions but also bargaining.
But a rule that exclusion should never harm the B shares will do as well, without so severely
curtailing a ﬁrm’s room for security design. Under either rule, all privately beneﬁcial takeovers
are socially desirable and vice versa, and the value gains are shared fairly between the current
shareholders and the bidder.
2Thus, the stinginess is more apparent than real. Indeed, recall that for the A shares, the post-bid value
sayr = sayi is just a threat: the implicit negotiation stage ensures that the rival actually shares about half
of the gains with the current shareholders. True, B shareholders would not take part, but (i) they knew that
when they bought the securities, and (ii) they can buy a portion in both classes of shares if they do not like
the discrimination.Endogenized acquisition and exclusion strategies 12
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